Barsalou, Lawrence W., and Christopher R. Hale. 1993. "Components of conceptual representation: From feature lists to recursive frames," in Categories and Concepts: Theoretical Views and Inductive Data Analysis, editors Ivan Van Mechelen, James Hampton, Ryszard S. Michalski, and Peter Theuns, 97-144. Cognitive Science Series, General Editors. Barry Richards, and Keith Stenning, London, UK: Academic Press.

Abstract: (from the chapter) present frames as a possible account of human concepts; clear alternatives to frames exist; specify the assumptions that underlie these different views, so that the unique properties of frames are clear... illustrate the fact that models of categorization are orthogonal to the representational distinction between feature lists and frames; show how classical models, exemplar models, prototype models, and connectionist models can all contain feature list representations; later see that these same models can contain simple frame and recursive frame representations as well... the primary alternative to frames are feature list representations; provide a detailed analysis of feature lists and the categorization models that use them; presents the additional assumptions that individuate frames, the use of frames in categorization models, arguments for why the expressive power of frames is necessary, and issues in measuring frames empirically. P128.C37.C38 1993 Ed-P.

D'Andrade, Roy. 1995. The Development of Cognitive Anthropology. xiv, 272 pp. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
GN502.D36 1995.

___. 1995. "Folk Taxonomies," Chapter Five in The Development of Cognitive Anthropology, 92-121. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Feature model of kinship did not transfer well when anthropologists looked at how people name plants and animals. More productive was to look at folk taxonomies, collections of statements of the form, "x is a kind of y." This was seen as a chunking process, in which a number of features (e.g., nose, tail, barking, fur) not only were used to identify a category of animal (dog) but also grouped together as a single "configurational attribute" (dogginess), thus conserving requirements on short-term memory. For example, to say that a collie is a kind of dog is also to say that collies possess the (configurational) attribute of "dogginess."
Berlin, Breedlove, and Raven found that folk taxonomies are generally limited to five levels, with the occasional insertion of a sixth. They posited these levels from top to bottom as: unique beginner, the top level with one and only one member (e.g., plant); life-form groupings usually few in number and based on "major perceptual discontinuities" (tree, bush, vine, grass); intermediates, the occasionally inserted level (pine); generics, ""natural kinds" that exhibit the largest clusters of features (dandelions, oaks, maples); specifics, which distinguish generics using a small number of features and usually require two-word terms (white oak, black oak, cork oak); varietals, a rarely occurring level of fine distinction that usually involves the addition of a third word in the terminology (baby lima bean, butter lima bean).
There is the phenomenon of covert categories, for which we have concepts but not words (e.g., trees that have leaves as opposed to pines). Anthropologists have used pile-sorting as well as elicitation methodologies with informants to reveal covert categories. Author summarizes some critiques of the folk taxonomic approach: findings from cultures where terms outside of the generics level are very few, the problem of how to integrate functional (flowers, weeds) as well as morphological criteria into taxonomies; the specialness of natural kinds (plants, animals) versus other domains (furniture, vehicles) in which folk taxonomies have been studied.
Goes on to discuss focal and extended ranges of color terms as compared across cultures (see Berlin & Kay 1969, Basic Color Terms). Describes methods and results in some depth. Chapter concludes with a discussion of the "Roschian synthesis," in which psychologist Eleanor Rosch extended the cognitive anthropological work on color terms and folk taxonomies into a psychological theory of categorization based on prototypes and basic-level objects.
GN502.D36 1995.

D'Andrade, Roy G. 1989. "Cultural Cognition," in Foundations of Cognitive Science, edited by Michael I. Posner, 795-830. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
BF311.F66 1989 ED-P.

Gardner, Howard. 1985. The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution. 423 pp. New York, NY: Basic Books.

This intellectual history is based both on published works in cognitive science and on formal and informal interviews with cognitive scientists conducted by the author, a psychologist. Part One, "The Cognitive Revolution," outlines the events leading up to and around the formation of cognitive science as a recognizable field of study in 1956.

In the introductory chapter, he makes a connection with modern cognitive science and ancient Greek epistemology in the kinds of questions about the mind that are raised. Introduces five key assumptions underlying cognitive science research: 1) That there is a level of mental representation "wholly separate from the biological or neurological, on the one hand, and the sociological or cultural, on the other;" 2) that the computer is an essential modelling tool for how the mind functions; 3) that affective, cultural, and situational factors may be important in cognition but that they complicate the scientific enterprise "unnecessarily;" 4) that much is to be gained by crossing and breaking down interdisciplinary boundaries; and 5) controversially, that the field is a reexamination of epistemological problems of long-standing in Western philosophy.

In Chapter 2, the author describes conferences and scholarship in the 1930s-mid 1950s and their wartime context. The "Hixon Symposium" at Caltech in 1948 featured talks on computational models of mind by mathematician von Neumann and neurophysiologist Warren McCulloch, and an open challenge to the tenets of behaviorism by psychologist Karl Lashley, who used examples of complex but common behavior such as speech and music-making to show up the inadequacy of stimulus-response models. The backdrop for this conference had been a 19th-cent. empiricist impatience with philosophical explanations that led to a proliferation of social science disciplines, followed 20th cent. wartime economies that concentrated intellectual capital on problems of numerical computation and engineering control systems. Key contributions and contributors in this period were: in mathematics and computation, Whitehead and Russell, John von Neumann, and Alan Turing; in neuronal modelling, Walter Pitts and Warren McCulloch; in the synthetic approach of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener; in information theory, Claude Shannon; in neuropsychological syndromes, the wartime medical clinics; <to be continued>
BF311.G283 1985.

Gardner, Howard. 1985. The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution, 49-88. New York, NY: Basic Books.

The survey of the six cognitive sciences begins in Chapter 4, with philosophy. He proceeds chronologically: the divide between Descartes' rationalism (body is mechanical, rational mind exists on a different plane and its knowledge is innate) and empiricism (Locke: knowledge is built up from sensory data; Berkeley: language is a barrier to communication; Hume: causality and mind are illusory); Kant's synthesis (introduction of schemata to mediate between sense perception and a priori categories) and claim for the primacy of philosophy; the rise of logical empiricism (derivation of mathematics from principles of logic) with Russell and Whitehead and the application of logic to language (early Wittgenstein, Rudolph Carnap); the fall of logical empiricism and the breakup of the terms of the rationalism/empiricism with Ryle (questioning the existence of mind and mental representations), the later Wittgenstein (all of the great philosophical problems reduce to language puzzles or games, prefers description of terminology to attempts at explanation), Austin (linguistic meanings depend on context), and Quine (there is no prior philosophical problem, we must look to experimental psychology for evidence of mind); Rorty's pronouncement of the death of epistemology (the relation between ideas and objects is socially constructed; physics, neurophysiology, sociology, and history explain everything and eliminate any need for psychology or epistemology); Fodor's unabashed rationalism (the neurological and psychological can be discussed separately; there is a "language of mind" but we can know its syntax only, not content). The fascination with syntax over semantics has at one time or another overtaken philosophers from both the empiricist (early Wittgenstein, Carnap) and the rationalist (Chomsky, Fodor) camps. Concludes with observations on the dialectical interplay between cognitive science and philosophy and the changing purview of the latter.

There are a few themes in this chapter that connect to issues in musicology. One is materialism: doe the acoustic signal tell us everything we need to know about musical content? A Cartesian or Kantian position says no (knowledge does not arise from experience, even if informed by it), while an empiricist or other naysayer of the concept of mind might say yes (e.g., Carnap, Ryle, Rorty). Quine also says that a science of mind is not deducible from sense data: "one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence" (quoted on 71). But there is a conflict between the assumption that a human nature exists and the tenets of cultural relativism that seem to be what Rorty upholds in his insistence that the great philosophical problems are nothing more that cultural preoccupations of Western thinkers; a quote from Putnam (77) makes clear this contemporary tension between relativism and universalism in philosophy. On the subject of ineffability, Rorty views such claims with respect to the mind with theologians' conceptions of God: "The ineffability of the mental serves the same cultural function as the ineffability of the divine--it vaguely suggests that science does not have the last word," (quoted on p. 72), which certainly describes the antiscience strain in musicology. Rorty also seems fundamentally opposed to anything resembling ecological or evolutionary psychology, in his rejection of the idea of mind as a "Mirror of Nature" and of its ability "to give us 'right opinions'" (85). How would he explain motor behavior? Gardner infers from Rorty's arguments a view of philosophy's proper role as cultural commentator [hence the incursion of cultural studies into philosophy?] rather than builder of systematic thought. Ryle's behaviorist denial of the existence of a human mind influenced Geertz, which in turn influenced a whole generation of anthropologists and ethnomusicologists.
BF311.G283 1985.

Hampton, James. 1993. "Prototype Models of Concept Representation," in Categories and Concepts: Theoretical Views and Inductive Data Analysis, editors Ivan Van Mechelen, James Hampton, Ryszard S. Michalski, and Peter Theuns, 67-95. Cognitive Science Series, General Editors. Barry Richards, and Keith Stenning, London, UK: Academic Press.
P128.C37.C38 1993

Summary of prototype research in cognitive psychology since the 1970s.

Hampton, James, and Danièle Dubois. 1993. "Psychological Models of Concepts: Introduction," in Categories and Concepts: Theoretical Views and Inductive Data Analysis, editors Ivan Van Mechelen, James Hampton, Ryszard S. Michalski, and Peter Theuns, 11-33. ix, 364 pp. Cognitive Science Series, General Editors. Barry Richards, and Keith Stenning, London, UK: Academic Press.
P128.C37.C38 1993

Chapter introduces first half of book, which is generally devoted to psychological models of concepts and categories. Authors present definitions of commonly-used terms, differing views of concepts, brief commentary on data-analytic methods (subject of the last half of the book), and challenges to existing views of concepts. The definitions and challenges sections are extremely useful, clearly written summaries of the literature.

Haselager, W. F. G. 1997. Cognitive Science and Folk Psychology: The Right Frame of Mind. viii, 165 pp. London, UK: Sage Publications.
BF311.H38 1997.

Jahoda, Gustav. 1982. Psychology and Anthropology: A Psychological Perspective. London: Academic Press.

An intellectual history, written by a self-described cross-cultural psychologist.
GN502.J33 1982 ANTH.

Johnson, Mark. 1987. The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason. xxxviii, 234 pp. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Lakoff, George. 1987. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind. 614 pp. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McNeill, David. 1992. Hand and Mind: What Gestures Reveal about Thought. xii, 416 pp. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Pike, Kenneth. 1954. Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior, v. 1. Glendale, CA: Summer Institute of Linguistics.

Solso, Robert L. 1994. Cognition and the Visual Arts. 312 pp. Cognitive Psychology Series, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Stillings, Neil A., Mark H. Feinstein, Jay L. Garfield, Edwina L. Rissland, David A. Rosenbaum, Steven E. Weisler, and Lynne Baker-Ward. 1987. Cognitive Science: An Introduction. xvii, 533 pp. A Bradford Book, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
BF311.C5523.

Tooby, John, and Leda Cosmides. 1992. "The Psychological Foundations of Culture," in The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture, edited by Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby, 19-136. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. BF711.A33 1992.

Argue against Durkheim's view that studying individuals is irrelevant to studying culture, and argue for a modular view of mind over a general-purpose processing mechanism.

Tyler, Stephen A., editor. 1969. Cognitive Anthropology. xiii, 521 pp. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
GN29.T9.

Whiting, H. T. A. (John), Stefan Vogt, and Beatrix Vereijken. 1992. "Human Skill and Motor Control: Some Aspects of the Motor Control-Motor Learning Relation," in Approaches to the Study of Motor Control and Learning, edited by J. J. Summers, 81-111. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier Science Publishers.

Authors review research on motor control and learning, two related but distinct areas of inquiry that have largely ignored each other.